The Rule of Equity

"So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets." Matthew 7:12

Christianity is not a fragment—but a complete system of religion; and it is intended and adapted to make us holy entirely and throughout. It teaches us a proper conduct and temper towards every being with whom we have any connection, particularly towards God and our fellow men.

A Christian is a complete, uniform, finished character; a character in which there is the most amiable symmetry and proportion; it is all of one piece, without rips and inconsistencies. A Christian is a penitent, a believer, a lover of God, conscientious in devotion, and diligent in attendance upon every ordinance of pious worship. He begins his religion with a supreme regard to God, the Supreme of beings, sensible that unless he begins here, he inverts the order of things, and that all his religion and virtue must be preposterous and vain. To love the Lord his God with all his heart, and to serve him from that exalted principle, is the first and great commandment with him; and he observes it as such. Religion, virtue, morality, and everything that bears a specious name among mankind—is a poor, maimed thing, monstrously defective, if a proper regard to God is left out of the system. It is shocking and unnatural for the creatures of God to be punctual in observing the duties they owe to one another—and yet entirely negligent of those radical fundamental duties they owe to him, their common Parent, the highest excellence, and the original of all authority and obligation.

But though Christianity begins with, and chiefly consists in our duty to God—yet it extends farther; it also includes a proper conduct and temper towards men. A godly Christian is not only devout towards God—but moral and virtuous towards men. He is not only a dutiful servant of God in matters purely religious—but he is a useful member of every society to which he belongs, and makes conscience of justice, charity, and all the good offices due to his fellow-creatures. He is a good ruler or a good subject, a good neighbour, a good father or child, a good master or servant; in short, he endeavours to have a "conscience void of offence towards God and towards men."

I have made it the great object of my ministry among you to bring you to pay a proper regard to God, as he has revealed himself in the gospel of his Son; and for this purpose have inculcated the important doctrines of faith, repentance, love, and those other graces which are essential to every godly man.

But I must not forget another part of my office, which is, to teach you the second great command, or summary of the divine law, namely, "That you should love your neighbour as yourselves," and inculcate upon you those important duties which you owe to mankind; and it is very foolish for people to refuse to love others, through a pretended relish for the gospel and the doctrines of grace, since love is an integral part of the gospel, and the lessons of morality run through the whole New Testament.

When I would discourse upon the duties of social life, I cannot choose a text more pertinent or copious than that I have read to you, which is a fundamental and most comprehensive rule of morality; "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets." In the illustration and improvement of this subject, I shall:

I. Offer a few things for the right understanding of this divine rule of social duty.

II. Consider the reason of it.

III. Open its excellency.

IV. Mention some important instances of particular cases to which it should be applied.

V. Lastly, show the necessity and advantage of observing it.

I. I am to offer a few things for the right understanding of this divine rule.

It is proper then to observe, that as there is a great diversity in the stations and characters of men, there is a proportion able diversity in the duties which they owe one to another; and self-love may make a man very extravagant in his expectations and desires about the conduct of another towards him. On these accounts it is necessary that we should understand this precept with these two cautions or limitations:

1. That we should do that to others—which we would expect and wish from them upon a change of condition, or if they were in our circumstances and we in theirs. Every man should be treated according to his character and station; and therefore that conduct which may be proper towards me in my station, may not be proper towards another in a different station. But let me suppose myself in his place and he in mine; and then that behaviour which I would expect from him—the same I should observe towards him.

Thus, for example, a magistrate is bound to protect his subjects, and to behave towards them as he would desire a ruler to behave towards him if he were a subject; but he is not bound to yield that submission to his subjects, while a ruler, which he may justly demand of them. The rule in such cases is—let every man act in character; let him perform to others those duties which he would desire from others—if they were in his circumstances, and he in theirs; and where there is a sameness of circumstances, there, and there only, his duty to others must be the same that he expects from them.

2. We should make only our reasonable and lawful expectations from others, the rule of our conduct towards them. A man may expect and wish very extravagant and sinful things from others: he may desire another should give him all his estate, or gratify his wicked lusts and passions by some criminal compliance. Such desires are by no means to be the rule of conduct; for we cannot indulge them, nor others comply with them, without acting wickedly and unreasonably. But those things which we may desire and expect from others, consistently with right reason, religion, and the laws of society, those things we ought to perform to them; those things which our consciences justify—and not those to which our inordinate self-love or some extravagant passion may prompt us.

If we understand this precept with such limitations as these, we may safely follow it as a general rule of conduct; and then it will not be liable to such objections as may be otherwise made against it. For example, a criminal may plead, "If I were in the place of my judge, and he in mine—then I would acquit him, and grant him his life." Or a judge might think, "If I were in the place of that poor criminal, I would be glad if my judge would forgive me: and therefore, if I would do as I would be done by—I must forgive him." Such thoughts as these, arising from wrong principles, are not to be the rule and measure of our actions or expectations; for our own consciences cannot approve of them in our sedate and impartial moments. I proceed,

II. To consider the reason of this precept. Now the reason or foundation of it is evidently this, namely—the natural equality of mankind. For notwithstanding the great difference in the capacities, improvements, characters, and stations of men—yet, considered as men, we all share in the same common nature, and are so far equal; and therefore, in the same circumstances, they have a right to the same treatment. A superior, for example, should treat his inferior just in the manner in which he would reasonably expect to be treated himself—if he was in a low condition and his inferior advanced to his station.

If there is any reason why another should behave in such a manner to me—that is the very same reason that I should behave in the same manner towards him; because he is to himself what I am to myself—as near, as dear, as important. Is it reasonable that my neighbour should make no encroachments upon my property? Then it is equally reasonable that I should not encroach upon his; for his property is as much his—as my property is mine. Do I expect that my neighbour should observe the rules of justice in his dealings with me? then certainly I should observe them in my dealings with him; for he has as good a right to be treated according to these rules, by me—as I have to be so treated by him.

If it is reasonable that he should guard my good name—then it is equally reasonable that I should guard his. If he should relieve me in my calamities, certainly I am equally bound to relieve him when in the same circumstances. And the reason is plain; he is to himself what I am to myself; and he is to me what I am to him; and therefore I am obliged to treat him as I would justly expect he would treat me; we are equal, and consequently our obligations are equal, and our duties mutual or reciprocal. Hence you see that this precept is the most reasonable thing in the world. My next business is,

III. To open the excellency of it. And this appears:

1. From its COMPREHENSIVENESS; it includes all the social duties of life; it is a short summary of the whole divine law, as far as it refers to our conduct towards man. This excellency Christ himself points out: This, says he—"sums up the Law and the Prophets." That is, it is the substance of both: do to others what you would have others do to you, and then you do to them all that the law and the prophets; and I may add, all that Christ and the apostles require you to do!

Now it is a great advantage to have the whole of our duty collected into such narrow bounds, and presented to us at one view! We are not sent to pore over many tedious volumes of laws and statutes, or to gather up fragments of precepts here and there—in order to learn our duty to one another. It is all summed up in this, "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you!" With this is connected another excellency of this precept; and that is,

2. Its CONCISENESS. It is what I may call a portable directory, which you may always carry about with you and easily recollect; and therefore you need never be at a loss to know your duty. You may always know your own expectations and desires. Do to others then—what you would expect and desire from them, and you are right—you do all that the law and the prophets require you to do. Tedious precepts and long discourses are not so easily learned or remembered; but the shortest memory cannot fail to recollect this concise command, "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you!"

3. Another excellency of this precept is, that it is UNIVERSAL, and extends to all mankind, in all circumstances! It extends to superiors, inferiors, and equals. It is true there is a great diversity in the characters and stations of men, which it is not your business, nor is it in your power to alter; and there is a correspondent variety in the duties you owe them. But you can easily imagine them all in the same circumstances; or you can easily suppose yourselves in their place, and they in yours. And then you can with equal ease look into your own minds, and consider what treatment you would expect from them in such a change of circumstances—and that will immediately reveal how you should treat them in their present circumstances. Thus the rule may be universally applied without impropriety. "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you!"

4. Another excellency of this precept is, that it is PLAIN and CONVICTIVE. Common minds may be bewildered, instead of being guided, by an intricate, tedious system of laws. But a man of the weakest understanding may easily perceive this golden rule. It is an appeal to his own sensations.

"What would you expect or wish from others? How would you have them treat you? Surely you must know this! Well, you are to treat them just in the same manner."

This is also a most convictive rule; for every man who thinks a little, must immediately own that it is highly reasonable; consult your own consciences, and they will tell you, you need no other adviser, and you are self-condemned if you violate this precept. It is written upon your hearts in illustrious indelible characters: it shines and sparkles there, like the Urim and Thummim on the breastplate of Aaron. I am,

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