16. Truth and Falsehood
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The duty of telling the truth seems to us, until we have devoted special consideration to the subject, the most simple thing in the world, both to understand and to perform; and when we find young children disregarding it, we are surprised and shocked—and often imagine that it indicates something peculiar and abnormal in the moral sense of the offender. A little reflection, however, will show us how very different the state of the case really is. What do we mean by the obligation resting upon us to tell the truth? It is simply, in general terms—that it is our duty to make our statements correspond with the realities which they purpose to express. This is, no doubt, our duty, as a general rule—but there are so many exceptions to this rule—and the principles on which the admissibility of the exceptions depend are so complicated and so abstruse, that it is amazing that children learn to make the necessary distinctions as soon as they do.
'Natural Guidance to the Duty of telling the Truth'.
The child, when he first acquires the art of using and understanding language, is filled with wonder and pleasure to find that he can represent external objects that he observes—and also ideas passing through his mind, by means of sounds formed by his organs of speech. Such sounds, he finds, have both these powers—that is, they can represent realities, orimaginary things. Thus, when he utters the sounds 'I see a bird', they may denote either a mere conception in his mind, or an outward actuality. How is he possibly to know, by any instinct, or intuition, or moral sense when it is right for him to use them as representations of a mere idea—and when it is wrong for him to use them, unless they correspond with some actual reality?
The fact that vivid images or conceptions may be awakened in his mind by the mere hearing of certain sounds made by himself or another is something strange and wonderful to him; and though he comes to his consciousness of this susceptibility by degrees, it is still, while he is acquiring it—and extending the scope and range of it, a source of continual pleasure to him. The necessity of any correspondence of these words—and of the images which they excite, with actual realities, is a necessity which arises from the relations of man to man in the social state—and he has no means whatever of knowing anything about it except by instruction.
There is not only no ground for expecting that children should perceive any such necessity either by any kind of instinct, or intuition, or youthful moral sense, or by any reasoning process of which his incipient powers are capable; but even if he should by either of these means be inclined to entertain such an idea, his mind would soon be utterly confused in regard to it by what he observes constantly taking place around him in respect to the use of language by others whose conduct, much more than their precepts, he is accustomed to follow as his guide.
'A very nice Distinction'.
A mother, for example, takes her little son, four or five years old, into her lap to amuse him with a story. She begins: "When I was a little boy I lived by myself. All the bread and cheese I got, I laid upon the shelf," and so on to the end. The mother's object is accomplished. The boy is amused. He is greatly interested and pleased by the astonishing phenomenon taking place within him of curious images awakened in his mind by means of sounds entering his ear—images of a little boy living alone, of his reaching up to put bread and cheese upon a shelf—and finally of his attempting to wheel a little wife home—the story ending with the breaking and downfall of the wheelbarrow, wife and all. He does not reflect philosophically upon the subject—but the principal element of the pleasure afforded him is the wonderful phenomenon of the formation of such vivid and strange images in his mind by means of the mere sound of his mother's voice.
He knows at once, if any half-formed reflections arise in his mind at all, that what his mother has told him is not true—that is, that the words and images which they awaken in his mind had no actual realities corresponding with them. He knows, in the first place, that his mother never was a boy—and does not suppose that she ever lived by herself—and laid up her bread and cheese upon a shelf. The whole story, he understands, if he exercises any thought about it whatever— wheelbarrow catastrophe and all—consists only of words which his mother speaks to him to give him pleasure.
By-and-by his mother gives him a piece of cake—and he goes out into the garden to play. His sister is there and asks him to give her a piece of his cake. He hesitates. He thinks of the request long enough to form a distinct image in his mind of giving her half of it—but finally concludes not to do so—and eats it all himself.
When at length he comes in, his mother accidentally asks him some question about the cake—and he says he gave half of it to his sister. His mother seems much pleased. He knew that she would be pleased. He said it, in fact, on purpose to please her. The words represented no actual reality—but only a thought passing through his mind—and he spoke, in a certain sense, for the purpose of giving his mother pleasure. The case corresponds in all these particulars with that of his mother's statement in respect to her being once a little boy and living by herself. Those words were spoken by her to give him pleasure—and he said what he did to give her pleasure. To give her pleasure! the reader will perhaps say, with some surprise, thinking that to assign such a motive as that is not, by any means, putting a fair and proper construction upon the boy's act. His design was, it will be said, to shield himself from censure, or to procure undeserved praise. And it is, no doubt, true that, on a careful analysis of the motives of the act, such as we, in our maturity, can easily make, we shall find that a design of deception, obscurely mingled with them. But the child does not analyze. He cannot. He does not look forward to ultimate ends, or look for the hidden springs which lie concealed among the complicated combinations of impulses which animate him.
In the case that we are supposing, all that we can reasonably believe to be present to his mind, is a kind of instinctive feeling that for him to say that he ate the cake all himself would bring a frown, or at least a look of pain and distress, to his mother's face—and perhaps words of displeasure for him; while, if he says that he gave half to his sister, she will look pleased and happy. This is as far as he sees. And he may be of such an age—and his mental organs may be in so embryonic a condition, that it is as far as he ought to be expected to look; so that, as the case presents itself to his mind in respect to the impulse which at the moment prompts him to act, he said what he did from a desire to give his mother pleasure—and not pain. As to the secret motive, which might have been his ultimate end, 'that' lay too deeply concealed for him to be conscious of it. And we ourselves too often act from the influence of hidden impulses of selfishness, the existence of which we are wholly unconscious of—to judge him too harshly for his blindness.
At length, by-and-by, when his sister conies in—and the untruth is discovered, the boy is astonished and bewildered by being called to account in a very solemn manner by his mother—on account of the awful wickedness of having told a lie!
'How the Child sees it'.
Now I am very ready to admit that, notwithstanding the apparent resemblance between these two cases, this resemblance is only apparent and superficial; but the question is, whether it is not sufficient to cause such a child to confound them—and to be excusable, until he has been enlightened by appropriate instruction, for not clearly distinguishing the cases wherewords must be held strictly to conform to actual realities, from those where it is perfectly right and proper that they should only represent images or conceptions of the mind.
A father, playing with his children, says, "Now I am a bear—and am going to growl." So he growls. Then he says, "Now I am a dog—and am going to bark." He is not a bear—and he is not a dog—and the children know it. His words, therefore, even to the apprehension of the children, express an untruth, in the sense that they do not correspond with any actual reality. It is not a wrongful untruth. The children understand perfectly well that in such a case as this it is not in any sense wrong to say what is not true. But how are they to know what kind of untruths are right—and what kind are wrong—until they are taught what the distinction is and upon what it depends.
Unfortunately many parents confuse the ideas, or rather the moral sense of their children, in a much more vital manner by untruths of a different kind from this—as, for example, when a mother, in the presence of her children, expresses a feeling of vexation and annoyance at seeing a certain visitor coming to make a call—and then, when the visitor enters the room, receives her with pretended pleasure—and says, out of politeness, that she is very glad to see her. Sometimes a father will join with his children, when peculiar circumstances seem, as he thinks, to require it, in concealing something from their mother, or deceiving her in regard to it by misrepresentations or positive untruths. Sometimes even the mother will do this in reference to the father. Of course such management as this, must necessarily have the effect of bringing up the children to the idea that deceiving by untruths is a justifiable resort in certain cases--a doctrine which, though entertained by many well-meaning people, strikes a fatal blow at all confidence in the veracity of men. For whenever we know of any people, that they entertain this idea, it is never afterwards safe to trust in what they say, since we never can know that the case in hand is not, for some reason unknown to us—one of those which justify a resort to falsehood.
But to return to the case of the children that are under the training of parents who will not themselves, under any circumstances, falsify their word—that is, will never utter words that do not represent actual reality in any of the wrongful ways. Such children cannot be expected to know of themselves, or to learn without instruction, what the wrongful ways are—and they never do learn until they have made many failures. Many, it is true, learn when they are very young. Many evince a remarkable tenderness of conscience in respect to this, as well as to all their other duties—as fast as they are taught them. And some become so faithful and scrupulous in respect to truth, at so early an age, that their parents quite forget the progressive steps by which they advanced at the beginning. We find many a mother who will say of her boy that he never told an untruth—but we do not find any man who will say of himself, that when he was a boy he never told one.
'Imaginings and Rememberings easily mistaken for each other'.
But besides the complicated character of the general subject, as it presents itself to the minds of children—that is, the intricacy to them of the question, when there must be a strict correspondence between the words spoken and an actual reality—and when they may rightly represent mere images or fancies of the mind—there is another great difficulty in their way, one that is very little considered and often, indeed, not at all understood by parents—and that is, that in the earliest years the distinction between realities and mere fancies of the mind, is very indistinctly drawn. Even in our minds the two things are often confounded. We often have to pause and think in order to decide whether a mental perception of which we are conscious is a remembrance of a reality, or a revival of some image formed at some previous time, perhaps remote, by a vivid description which we have read or heard, or even by our own imagination. "Is that really so, or did I dream it?" How often is such a question heard. And people have been known to certify honestly, in courts of justice, to facts which they think they personally witnessed—but which were really pictured in their minds in other ways than reality. The picture was so distinct and vivid that they lost, in time, the power of distinguishing it from other and, perhaps, similar pictures which had been made by their witnessing the corresponding realities.
Indeed, instead of being surprised that these different origins of present mental images are sometimes confounded, it is actually astonishing that they can generally be so clearly distinguished; and we cannot explain, even to ourselves, what the difference is by which we do distinguish them.
For example, we can call up to our minds the picture of a house burning and a fireman going up by a ladder to rescue some person appearing at the window. Now the image, in such a case, may have had several different modes of origin. 1. We may have actually witnessed such a scene the evening before. 2. Someone may have given us a vivid description of it. 3. We may have fancied it in writing a tale. 4. We may have dreamed it. Here are four different prototypes of a picture which is now renewed—and there is something in the present copy which enables us, in most cases, to determine at once what the real prototype was. That is, there is something in the picture which now arises in our mind as a renewal or repetition of the picture made the day before, which makes us immediately cognizant of the cause of the original picture—that is, whether it came from a reality that we witnessed, or from a verbal or written description by another person, or whether it was a fanciful creation of our own mind while awake, or a dream. And it is extremely difficult for us to discover precisely what it is, in the present mental picture, which gives us this information in respect to the origin of its prototype. It is very easy to say, "Oh, we remember." But remember is only a word. We can only mean by it, in such a case as this, that there is some 'latent difference' between the several images made upon our minds today of things seen, heard of, imagined, or dreamed yesterday, by which we distinguish each from all the others. But the most acute metaphysicians—men who are accustomed to the closest scrutiny of the movements and the mode of action of their minds—find it very difficult to discover what this difference is.
'The Result in the Case of Children'.
Now, in the case of young children, the faculties of perception and consciousness and the power of recognizing the distinguishing characteristics of the different perceptions and sensations of their minds, are all immature—and distinctions which even to mature minds are not so clear, but that they are often confounded—for them form a bewildering maze. Their minds are occupied with a mingled and blended though beautiful combination of sensations, conceptions, imaginations and remembrances, which they do not attempt to separate from each other—and their vocal organs are animated by a constant impulse to exercise themselves with any utterances which the incessant and playful gambollings of their faculties frame. In other words, the vital force liberated by the digestion of the food seeks an outlet—now in this way and now in that—through every variety of mental and bodily action. Of course, to arrange and systematize these actions, to establish the true relations between all these various faculties and powers—and to regulate the obligations and duties by which the exercise of them should be limited and controlled, is a work of time—and is to be effected, not by the operation of any instinct or early intuition—but by a course of development—effected mainly by the progress of growth and experience, though it is to be aided and guided by assiduous but gentle training and instruction.
If these views are correct, we can safely draw from them the following practical conclusions.
'Practical Conclusions'.
1. We must not expect from children, that they will from the beginning, understand and feel the obligation to speak the truth—any more than we look for a recognition, on their part, of the various other principles of duty which arise from the relations of man to man in the social state. We do not expect that two babies creeping upon the floor towards the same plaything, should each feel instinctively impelled to grant the other the use of it half of the time. Children must be taught to tell the truth, just as they must be taught the principles of justice and equal rights. They generally get taught by experience—that is, by the rough treatment and hard knocks which they bring upon themselves by their violation of these principles. But the faithful parent can aid them in acquiring the necessary knowledge in a far easier and more agreeable manner, by appropriate instruction.
2. The mother must not be distressed or too much troubled when she finds that her children, while very young are prone to fall into deviations from the truth—but only to be made to feel more impressed with the necessity of renewing her own efforts to teach them the duty—and to train them to the performance of it.
3. She must not be too stern or severe in punishing the deviations from truth, in very young children, or in expressing the displeasure which they awaken in her mind. It is instruction, not expressions of anger or vindictive punishment—which is required in most cases. Explain to them the evils that would result if we could not believe what people say—and tell them stories of truth-loving children on the one hand—and of false and deceitful children on the other. And, above all, notice, with indications of approval and pleasure, when the child speaks the truth under circumstances which might have tempted him to deviate from it. One instance of this kind, in which you show that you observe and are pleased by his truthfulness, will do more to awaken in his heart a genuine love for the truth than ten reprovals, or even punishments, incurred by the violation of it. And in the same spirit we must make use of the religious considerations which are appropriate to this subject—that is, we must encourage the child with the approval of his heavenly Father, when he resists the temptation to deviate from the truth, instead of frightening him, when he falls, by terrible denunciations of the anger of God against liars; denunciations which, however well-deserved in the cases to which they are intended to apply, are not designed for children in whose minds the necessary discriminations, as pointed out in this chapter, are yet scarcely formed.
'Danger of confounding Deceitfulness and Falsehood'.
4. Do not confound the criminality of deceitfulness by acts—with falsehood by words, by telling the child, when he resorts to any artifice or deception in order to gain his ends, that it is as bad to deceive as to lie. It is not as bad, by any means. There is a marked line of distinction to be drawn between falsifying one's word and all other forms of deception, for there is such a sacredness in the spoken word, that the violation of it is in general far more reprehensible than the attempt to accomplish the same end, by mere deceitful action.
If a man has lost a leg, it may be perfectly right for him to wear a wooden one which is so perfectly made, as to deceive people—and even to wear it, too, with the 'intent' to deceive people by leading them to suppose that both his legs are genuine. But it would be wrong—for him to assert in words, that this limb was not an artificial one. It is right to put a chalk egg in a hen's nest, to deceive the hen, when, if the hen could understand language—and if we were to suppose hens "to have any rights that we are bound to respect," it would be wrong to 'tell' her that it was a real egg. It would be right for a person, when his house was entered by a robber at night, to point an empty gun at the robber to frighten him away by leading him to think that the gun was loaded; but it would be wrong, as I think—though I am aware that many people would think differently—for him to say in words that the gun was loaded—and that he would fire unless the robber went away. These cases show that there is a great difference between deceiving by false appearances, which is sometimes right—anddeceiving by false statements, which, as I think, is always wrong. There is a special and inviolable sacredness, which every lover of the truth should attach to his spoken word.
5. We must not allow the leniency with which, according to the views here presented, we are to regard the violations of truth by young people, while their mental faculties and their powers of discrimination are yet imperfectly developed, to lead us to lower the standard of right in their minds, so as to allow them to imbibe the idea that we think that falsehood is, after all, no great sin—and still less, to suppose that we consider it sometimes, in extreme cases, allowable. We may, indeed, say, "The truth is not to be spoken at all times," but to make the aphorism complete, we must add, that 'falsehood' is 'never' to be spoken. There is no other possible ground for absolute confidence in the word of any man, except the conviction that his principle is—that it is 'never, under any circumstances, or to accomplish any purpose whatever,' right for him to falsify it.
A different opinion, I am aware, prevails very extensively among mankind—and especially among the continental nations of Europe, where it seems to be very generally believed that in those cases in which falsehood will on the whole be conducive of greater good than the truth—that it is allowable to employ falsehood. But it is easy to see that, so far as we know, that those around us hold to this philosophy, all reasonable ground for confidence in their statements is taken away; for we never can know, in respect to any statement which they make, that the case is not one of those in which, for reasons not manifest to us—they think it is expedient—that is, conducive in some way to good—to state what is not true.
While, therefore, we must allow children a reasonable time to bring their minds to a full sense of the obligation of making their words always conform to what is true, instead of shaping them so as best to attain their purposes for the time being—which is the course to which their earliest natural instincts prompt them—and must deal gently and leniently with their incipient failures, we must do all in our power to bring them forward as fast as possible to the adoption of the very highest standard as their rule of duty in this respect; inculcating it upon them, by example as well as by precept—that we cannot innocently, under any circumstances, falsify our word to escape any evil, or to gain any end. For there is no evil so great—and no end to be attained so valuable, as to justify the adoption of a principle which destroys all foundation for confidence between man and man.
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